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All our readings are misreadings (spoken at Vanderbilt Univer
sity, 1989),
I try to write the question: (what is) meaning to say? Therefore it
is necessary in such a space, and guided by such a question, that
writing literally mean nothing. Not that it is absurd in the way that
absurdity has always been in solidarity with metaphysical mean
ing. It simply tempts itself, tenders itself, attempts to keep itself
at the point of the exhaustion of meaning. To risk meaning
nothing is to start to play, and fltst enter into the play of
differance which prevents any word, any concept, any major
enunciation from coming to summarize and to govern from the
theological presence of a center the movement and textual
spacing of differences .. , this 'meaning-to-say-nothing' is not,
you will agree, the most assured of exercises.
'Thought' ... means nothing: it is the substantified void of a
highly deri vative ideality, the effect of a differance of forces, the
illusory autonomy of a discourse or consciousness whose
hypostasis is to be deconstrocted, whose 'causality' is Lo be
analyzed, etc .... Whatever will continue to be called thought, and
Which, for example, will designate the deconstruction of
logocentrism, means nothing, for in the last analysis it no longer
derives from 'meaning.' Wherever it operates, 'thought' means
nothing (P, pp. 14,49).
In broaching your question. you also noted that I meant some
thing and that, even if you did not understand it completely, you
were convinced of my wanting-to-say-something. I am less sure
of this than you (Wood, p. 89).

We should note that Derrida's saying is not "some of our readings
are misreadings," nor "our readings tend to be misreadings," but the
universal, all-inclusive assertion, "all our readings are misreadings." What
we have here is not a difficulty in communication but absence of commu
nication, and not a difficulty to be dealt with and minimized but an absence
never to be encroached upon, a gap never to be narrowed.
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To use the metaphor of a gun, itisn't "all OUI firings are misses" but
"all our firings are misfirings," i.e. the gun does not go off. When we read,
the hammer hits the head of the bullet but there is only a "click." Derrida is
dealing with more than the inevitability of misinterpretations or an anarchy
ofperspectivism in the handling oftexts (though he is saying those things).
In this paper, I would like to attempt:
(1) An identification of who Derrida is and what he is doing. In
this section, I will seek to show that Derrida and his work
constitute a sign of the meaninglessness or nothingness that
lies just beneath the surface of existence, that his role is
philosophical.
(2) An illustration ofDerrida' sdeliberate "misreadings" of texts,
how Derrida responds when he is misread, and briefly how
deconstrnction is playing a role in the literary community (a
look at Stanley Fish) in dealing with texts.
(3) A call for an appreciation and qualified inclusion ofDerrida
in textual interpretation.

I. Who Is Jacques Derrida?
By this, I do not mean things like his being an Algerian Jew who came to
France when he was nineteen, but who is he in terms of his philosophical/
literary impact on the world? For that, I know ofno better starting place than
the address Derrida gave in 1968 in Paris called simply, "Difjerance." I
purposely come to the text for his own voice, the record of his own words,
so as much as possible to let his speech identify him. He begins by saying,
I will speak:, therefore,ofaletter. Ofthef"rrstIetter, ifthe alphabet,
and most of the speculations which have ventured into it, are to
bebelieved. I will speak, therefore, ofthe letter a, this initial letter
which it apparently has been necessary to insinuate, here and
there into the writing of the word difference ...
Now it happens, I would say in effect, that this graphic difference
(a instead of e), this marked difference between two apparently
vocal notations between two vowels, remains purely graphic: it
is read, or it is written, but it cannot be heard (MP, pp. 3-4).

Derrida continues by saying that the presence ofthe letter a inits capital form
(A) is compared in shape to an Egyptian pyramid in Hegel's Encyclopedia
so that it remains "silent, secret, and discreet as a tomb" and "not far from
announcing the death of the tyrant" (MP. p. 4). The fact that a and e cannot
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be differentiated in the last syllable of differ(ela)nce when spoken but only
when written or read show us there is a "silence" in "so-called phonetic
writing," a failure to convey difference, and consequently, (according to
Derrida) "there is no phonetic writing."
In logic, Derrida's argument is a blatant fallacy-the error of
generalizing from an exception (a and e being indistinguishable in sound in
a particular word is used to conclude that all letters fail to denote distinct
sounds). Most of the time letters do a very good job of distinguishing and
differentiating sounds and that is why phonics are used in spe1ling in spite
ofall the exceptions. BuUfwereacted this way and rejected Derrlda' swords
as nonsense, we would be extremely unimagInative and philosophically
dull.
What if one were to begin with Nietzschean meaninglessness and
decide to use that which is most pretentious in the conveyance of mean
ings-Le., words-as an effigy of the non-existent Word (considered
philosophically or theologically), an effigy not to be burned but dismantled
(deconstructed) in order to signify the end ofmeaning? What lfthe death of
God and Truth in Heavenis followed by the death of Man and truth on Earth?
What if philosophy's debunking of Plato's Big Meanings undercuts the
integrity of all little and ordinary meanings? If one were to take a word, then,
like difference, and observe what happens when the e becomes an a, listen
to the failure of a textto carry Ufe, significant sound distinguishing one letter
from another, one feels the instability of words and wonders about other
losses inherent with language. Derrida is understandable in these terms as
a philosopher making an effigy oflanguage-disrupting and deconstructing
it-to protest the Silence in the universe, a Silence ready to quake under
every word like a city built on a fauIt line.
Who is Jacques Derrida? He is that indeterminate sound, that
flickering between the e and the a, that silent and open space between the r
and the n of differ_nce which disrupts the e, x' s it out, makes it a space, then
an a, then a space, then ane, and from then on the e and all texluality is never
the same. When Derrida speaks in conventional, linguistic terms (though
always tentatively), the e is at work. When Derrida exists in movement as
space to introduce the a, he is disruption, ever-changing, Heraclitean
energy, intervention, and play. When Derrida operates as the a, he uses
words to undercut words ("writing" means "nothing") and metaphysics to
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undercut metaphysics ('''thought' means nothing"). Consequently, with the
energy and change characteristic ofDerrida. it is difficult when questioning
him or reading his texts to know ifhe Is the e (saying the tentative sayable),
the space (disrupting the sayable), or the a (using the sayable to point to the
Unsayable).
Derrida exists, then, as a philosophical sign. He is the flickering a
behind the e reminding us of the tentativeness, the thinness of all human
meanings andofthe deep silence just below. HeistheA as Egyptian pyramid
announcing the death of the tyrant which is all the language ever spoken
language which promised us The Truth, The Word, The Meaning of the
Universe commandeered directly or indirectly by God or Man at the center.
There is no ground and no center, and Derrida exists to undermine and
unsettle, to "clean house" with respect to Western metaphysics.
He resists identifying himself because he is against the very pre
sumption of classification and naming. He resists the tombstone existence
of concepts buried within words. So, we can save ourselves time by not
asking him who heis. If we want to know who he is we must (ironically) try
not to misread him. If he intends or means anything in all this movement, it
is, "Play, for Nothingness is with us and at the door."
Derrida as the Flickering A is playful and so playful that even
sympathizers are sometimes embarrassed with his antics. John Llewelyn in
his Derrida on the Threshold ofSense says that what Rorty and others find
so shocking about Derrida is his "multilingual puns, joke etymologies.
allusions from anywhere, and phOnic and typographical gimmicks" (p. 114).
(Frankly, I am surprised at Llewelyn because in that same book he refers to
something Derrida considers a fallacy in Freud's thinking but uses the
spelling, p-h-a-l-l-u-s-y, without any quotation marks to clarify ifLlewelyn
or Derrida is "fooling around" here.)
Why does Derrida refuse the label of "negative theology" and all
other labels? Because he refuses the Western metaphysical constructs in
which a11language is enmeshed, because he refuses the pegging ofmeaning,
the confidence of thought or meaning existing Of having a happy transmis
sion in words. Derrida says,
To be very schematic I would say that the difficulty of defining
and therefore also oftmnslating the word 'deconstruction' stems
from the fact that all the predicates, all the defining concepts, all
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the lexical significations, and even the syntactic articulations,

whicb seem at one moment to lend themselves to this definition
or to that translation, are also deconstructed or deconstructible,
directly or otherwise, etc. And that goes for the word, the very
unity of the word deconstruction, as for every word.

Consequently, Derrida also says,
All sentences of the type 'deconstruction is X' or 'deconstruction
is not X' a priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at
least false (Wood, p. 4).

Again, I think there is a blatant problem with what Derrida is saying
on a literalleve1. Obviously, both deconstruction and Derrida come to us
through words, concepts, assertions, etc. Here is someone who works to
keep himself (as he says) on the outer edge of "the exhaustion of meaning,"
but nonetheless, without thought and its conveyance through words there
would be no deconstruction and no Derrida, so it begs the question to act as
ifDerrida can never be conceptualized. If he spoke only gibberish, he would
have been escorted to an asylum and we would be reading someone else.
The play does have a feel of negative theology, though, much like
the Israelites who in the absence of a Moses on the mount receiving the Word
of God make a golden calf (a fiction), engorge themselves with food, then
rise up "to play." There is a real sense ofrecess from absolutes and eternal
values feltin Derrida' s textual play. There is an anti-metaphysical largeness
and expansiveness to his "fooling" with texts, an equivocation and playful
disguise, that would have echoed well in Zarathustra's cave.
It is interesting to note as well that when Demda writes to aJapanese
friend who is looking for a suitable translation for "deconstruction," he
speaks of dictionary definitions such as "disarranging the construction of'
and "to disassemble the parts of a whole." He also traces the history of
deconstruction as a reaction to structuralism, "an antistructurallst gesture,"
even a "demolition" of any confidence in language as it stands tied to
Western metaphysiCS. So Derrida does not entirel y dispense with words to
define deconstruction. (He knows how to don the disguise ofthe tentative e.)
II. Derrida And Misreadings

Among the proponents of deconstruction there is an effort to
minimize any adverse impact Derrida might have with "hands on" textual
interpretation because there are those who feel that Derrida could wreak
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havoc with his "all our readings are misreadings" and his textual nihilism.
First of all, it seems to me that people like Stanley Fish with his "Is there a
Text in this Class?" really do raise the spectre ofliterary communities acting
out a Derridean, anti-metaphysical, nihilistic approach to texts. When we
read Fish and he says "that the notions of 'same' or 'different' texts are
fictions" (p. 169), that "perspectival perception is all there is" (p. 365), and
that "no reading, however outlandish it might appear, is inherently an
impossible one" (p. 347), we see the Flickering A and hear Derrida's
laughter (p. 169). Fish does not believe there are accurate or proper readings
oftexts, but that the reader (and ultimately the literary institution) arbitrarily
gives or assigns the text its meaning. (The only check on "arbitrary" is the
voice of the literary community.) Here the text is not the final reference to
evaluate readings. Interpretations will change and evolve as the community
changes with the passage of time. Meaning is not transcendental or fixed:
"Heaven and Earth" will pass away, and so will today's interpretation.
Derrida himselfhas no hesitation in misreading a text and assigning
it the meaning he wants it to have. For example, I laughed when I first read
Derrida's statement that "for Nietzsche 'the great principal activity is
unconscious(ness)'" and that "all of Nietzsche's thought" is "a critique of
philosophy as an active indifference to difference" (MP, p. 17). The great
principal activity for Nietzsche is the Will to Power, and the only one for
whom the critique of philosophy must be for its indifference to difference
is Derrida-not Nietzsche. But then again, did not Heidegger in his book
on Nietzsche give us more of Heidegger than Nietzsche and before that did
not Nietzsche usurp David Hume's work by saying in Twilight o/the Idols.
"I was the first to formulate... that there are no moral facts?" Derrida seems
to be operating faithfully within a tradition. After all if perspectivism is aU
there is (and Nietzsche did say that) why not impose our perspecti ve (textual
violence) very forthrightly and unapologetically upon everything we read
and represent? Where all is seeming and nothing is real, why should we care
about maintaining the integrity ofwhat someone else has written-espeeiall y
if we do not think that what someone else has written is objectively
decipherable to begin with?
But we do mind when we are misread by others, even Derrida
minds. Michael Fischer in Does Deconstruction Make Any Difference?
mentions the irony ofDerrida' s feeling misread by John Searle in a literary
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critiqueofDerrida. Derrida says things like "by ignoring this orthat moment
of the text" and refers to Searle's "autistic representation" and obliterating
contexts (p. 40). In the real world where texts do have an objectivity that
minds can subjectively apprehend, people feel hurt when "justice" is not
done to their text. (In Irene Harvey's book on Derrida, she apologizes to
Derrida-though she is herself a deconstructionist-for any failure to do
justice to his texts.) This is worlds away from both Derrida's and Fish's
tentativeness about language and textuality-theinevitability ofmisreadings.
If misreadings are the rule and not the exception, why should Derrida be
upset and Harvey apologize? Is not their behavior here a tacit adherence to
both the possibility and desirability of accurate textual readings? Meaning
lessness at the center of the universe is fine to talk about when we are dealing
with someone else' s texts but whenit comes to our own, suddenly it becomes
important to believe that there is a ground and center for discussion: we
become logocentric when it is our logos at the center.
III. A Can For Inclusion

Finally, I would like to suggest, in what might seem to be a
contractiction of all that I have said heretofore, how I think Derrida should
be included in our approach to the interpretation of texts. Needless to say.
Derrida is wilh us to stay. His presence as what I have called the Flickering
A is as symbolic and important for philosophylIiterature as Socrates the
gadfly who, ill a sense, went about "deconstructing" everyone's claims to
wisdom, and Heraclitus for whom all reality is disruption and change.
That Derrida exists as a sign means that he is not to be taken as a
standard or literary method for interpretation. As Joseph Margolis says,
deconstruction is "not a canon of procedures or criteria for testing the
adequacy of procedures for interpreting texts or for assessing the cognitive
fit between interpretation and text..." (Margolis, p. 148). When Isaiah
walked around naked for 3 years as a sign of Israel's coming captivity, his
action was not intended as a dress code for his time. Derrida is asign for the
implications of there being no God in the universe, no Word behind all
human words, no Text written in Nature or Scripture which in some way
supports all human textuality.
Positively speaking, in literary interpretation where Derrida oper
ates as a sign we are less likely to feel we have nailed down any and all
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possibiUties arising from a text's meaning. We will watch for the Flickering
A, the unsaid and unsayable behind a text, the meanings that fall through the
cracks or get lost through the structure. The Flickering A makes us respect
the element of surprise and helps us resist the tendency to capitulate to the
"letter that kills." Life has movement, surprise, and disguise to it, and
nothing is more deadly than the tendency in classrooms to simply "crank
out" textbook interpretations that leave both teacher and student cold.
With these qualifications of Derrida's role, I think his inclusion to
the literary community is significant and worthwhile.
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